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ABSTRACT 
Following the inclusion of the Common Commercial Policy in the exclusive 
competences of the European Union, a handful of policy adjustments have occurred. 
Among these adjustments, investment protection has been a remarkable one - given 
its new, exclusive framework and an already established, state-level practice. As the 
new policy stands, Bilateral Investment Treaties, which had been negotiated and 
executed by the EU Member States in the pre-Lisbon period, can now only be 
negotiated and executed by the EU. These prospective ‘EU BITs’, inter alia, aim for 
an even stronger mechanism for the protection of investors both in the EU and in 
third states. A strong protection mechanism inevitably calls for a strong Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, and the establishment of a DSM may prove to be challenging. 
The EU currently faces several questions on its path to a tangible and reliable ‘EU 
BIT’, and arguably the most outstanding one is the question of the DSMs to be 
incorporated in these new agreements. What are the alternatives of a DSM for these 
new BITs? Which alternatives are currently utilizable and which ones are not? What 
are the current problems that the EU face, and how can those problems be tackled? 
Is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes an alternative, and 
if not, why? Following a thorough overview, this paper aims to analyse the DSM 
alternatives for the EU to be used in the new EU BITs and ultimately provide a solid 
DSM proposal. 
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1 Abbreviations 
AISCC  Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
BIT   Bilateral Investment Treaty 
CCP   Common Commercial Policy 
DSM   Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
EC  European Community 
ECJ   European Court of Justice 
EU  European Union 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
IBPC   International Bureau of the Permanent Court 
IBRD  International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
ICC   International Chamber of Commerce 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICSID  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
MFN   Most-favoured Nation 
PCA   Permanent Court of Arbitration 
TEU  Treaty on the European Union 
TFEU   Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UN  United Nations 
UNCITRAL  United Nations Commission for International Trade Law 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UK  United Kingdom 
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2 Introduction 
Ever since the Lisbon Treaty came into force and amended the previous Treaties, a 
handful of competence adjustments took place and several areas previously 
regulated and specified under the Treaties as a shared competence of the EU and the 
Member States have been amended. FDI, as a part of the CCP, stands as a 
remarkable example of these competence adjustments: before the Lisbon Treaty, 
“investment was a policy field with a specific division of work between the EU and its 
Member States”1, however the competence over CCP is now within the exclusive 
competence of the EU, pursuant to Article 207(1) and Article 3(1)(e) of the TFEU. 
Such adjustment has had several effects on already existing investment agreements. 
A BIT, before the Lisbon Treaty, was an agreement at the state-level for the Member 
States within their competence in the larger framework of shared competences. For 
the Member States, BITs were seen to be crucial instruments for establishing trade 
relations with third states. As the EU had held a more limited competence in 
investment policy, the Member States were in charge of negotiating and executing 
BITs with third states on their own. This created a very complex BIT ‘pool’ in the EU 
and with third states. Including an extensive investment definition and multi-
branched investor protection clauses, most of these BITs, if not all, also included a 
DSM. Whereas some BITs included a state-state DSM, some included investor-state 
DSMs; and another group included both. 
DSMs established by the BITs do not only differ in terms of being state-state or 
investor-state - another very important division (under investor-state) is whether to 
establish an institutionalized arbitration mechanism (such as the ICSID) or to conduct 
ad hoc arbitration (optionally functioning under predetermined rules such as the 
UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration)2. DSM was not a controversial matter before the 
Lisbon Treaty in terms of ‘forum selection’, since states were competent to conclude 
investment treaties. BITs are traditionally considered to be state-level agreements, 
and states are generally eligible to adopt any sort of dispute settlement forum or 
method, should they desire and take the necessary steps in accordance with the 
international law. 
In this regard, the EU is facing many new challenges that essentially originate from 
its legal character since it is not a state. This inevitably creates several questions 
such as the dispute resolution clauses that the new ‘EU BITs’ will contain: what are 
the possibilities for the EU and third states to resolve their disputes arising from 
these new BITs? Should these new BITs adopt a state-state DSM, or should there be 
an investor-state dispute mechanism? Should these BITs focus on an ad hoc method 
for arbitration, or should they include an arbitration mechanism through institutions? 
Can the EU, as a party of these BITs, apply for arbitration to, for instance, the ICSID? 
Can the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration be an alternative? Could parties assign 
Chambers of Commerce to administer ad hoc tribunals? Could there be new 
                                                
1 European Commission Memorandum of 7 July 2010. Q&A: Commission Launches 
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy. 
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2003. Dispute Settlement: Investor-
State, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Arrangements. United Nations. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf. 
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alternatives specifically for the EU BITs, given the EU’s relatively different legal status 
(from a state or an international organization)? 
It should be clarified that the discussion regarding the DSM to be implanted in new 
EU BITs is, legally speaking, far from being insurmountable since it is without a 
doubt that international actors can always choose one option or another, take 
necessary measures, conduct amendments to relevant international instruments and 
ultimately tackle these problems. Therefore, rather than merely observing what the 
options are, it is also imperative to mention what the preferences may or could be. In 
other words, whether or not the international actors, which are political entities, 
would agree to conduct these legal solutions is an important aspect of this topic. For 
example, is it true, as some scholars suggest, that the EU seems to be rather 
hesitant3 about the investor-state dispute mechanism when it is known to be the 
most effective investor protection mechanism? 
In this context, this paper will firstly aim to provide a brief background of the effects 
of the Lisbon Treaty with regard to investment policy. Accordingly, following a 
discussion about the methods of dispute settlement this paper will observe both ad 
hoc and institutionalized arbitration systems in relation to investment disputes. 
Furthermore, the current dispute resolution mechanisms will be individually 
discussed and their compatibility with the EU will be inspected. 
                                                
3 Reinisch, August. 2010. The Division of Powers between the EU and its Member States after 
Lisbon. Internationaler Investitionsschutz und Europarecht, edited by Marc Bungenberg, Jörn 
Briebel and Steffen Hindelang. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pg. 99-
110. 
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3 The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on Investment Policy 
3.1 Competence for Investment Policy before the Lisbon Treaty 
The EU (before the Lisbon Treaty, the EC (or “the Community”)) did not practice an 
exclusive competence in the field of international investment before the Lisbon 
Treaty. Instead, the Member States and the EC shared the competence. There are two 
reasons for this shared competence: first, the Treaties did not provide for an explicit 
exclusive competence for the Community; and second, there was no implied 
exclusive competence, since none of the regulations and measures taken in 
accordance with those regulations expressed or implied such a competence for the 
EC4. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional and judicial practice was very different 
than what it will be in the future as the new exclusive EU competence shapes itself. 
First of all, with its Opinion 1/945, the ECJ emphasized that the FDI activities 
involving third states could not be considered within the exclusive competence of 
the EC. There was a division in competence; for example, provisions covered by 
almost every BIT, such as expropriation and investment protection, were out of the 
EU’s competence, whereas it enjoyed the competence for market access and non-
discrimination matters6. It was, therefore, technically impossible for the EU to take 
an exclusive initiative to negotiate and execute broad-scoped investment 
agreements. Within this scheme of competence, these agreements could only be 
negotiated conjointly. In the following years, the Member States and the EC in fact 
practiced this shared competence and concluded FTAs containing FDI provisions, 
such as the EU – Chile Association Agreement7. It is also important to underline that 
the dispute settlement clauses provided for in this agreement were of a state-state 
nature, given that negotiating an investor-state dispute settlement fell outside the 
competence of the EU8. 
This lack of exclusive competence inevitably caused complications – not only 
because the competence was shared, but also because every Member State had a 
right to veto the FTAs that included investment chapters. This inevitably slowed 
down the ratification process of the FTAs, startled the third states and even 
decreased the credibility of those agreements in the eyes of European investors. 
Additionally, the content of the agreements were relatively narrower than what 
would normally be negotiated and executed by individual Member States. The 
European Commission, aware of this situation, remarked that “[…] EU agreements 
and achievements in the area of investment lag behind because of their narrow 
                                                
4 Shan, Wenhua and Zhang, Sheng. 2011. The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common 
Investment Policy. The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, no. 4, pg. 1050. 
5 European Court of Justice, Opinion 1/94, ECR I-5267, 15 November 1994. 
6 Maybel, Niklas. 2007. The European Community’s Minimum Platform on Investment or the 
Trojan Horse of Investment Competence. International Investment Law in Context, edited by 
August Reinisch and Christina Knahr. Eleven International Publishing. Also see; Mola, Lorenza. 
2008. Which Role for the EU in the Development of International Investment Law? Working 
Paper 26/08, Inaugural Conference, Geneva, 15 – 17 July 2008. 
7 EU-Chile Association Agreement, O.J. 2002 L-352, 18 November 2002. 
8 Ibid, Title VIII, Articles 181-188. 
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content. As a result, European investors are discriminated vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors […]”(sic.).9 
With regard to BITs, the competence belonged to the Member States to negotiate 
and execute them. BITs have a remarkable history of practice among the EU Member 
States. Germany has approximately 140 BITs, followed by the UK with around 12010. 
These BITs, inter alia, usually provide for an extensive definition of ‘investment’, 
include provisions for MFN, provide protection against expropriation and repatriation 
and establish a DSM. Since almost all Member States11 are signatories of the ICSID 
Convention and are also eligible to refer to any other dispute settlement forum, 
there was little argument on the compatibility of DSMs at the state level. Investor 
protection, thus, was regulated and executed by the Member States themselves, and 
there was no EU interference in that matter. It is, of course, provided that those BITs 
executed by Member States do not violate EU law. Pursuant to Article 307 of the then 
EC Treaty12, “[t]o the extent that […] agreements are not compatible with the 
Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established.” In accordance with this article, such 
incompatibilities, if not eliminated, might lead to an additional obligation to 
terminate the BITs causing the violation13. 
To sum up, prior to the Lisbon Treaty’s inclusion of FDI within the EU’s exclusive 
competence, the only possible interference from the EU regarding the execution of 
those existing BITs was within the context of Article 307 of the EC Treaty. It is, of 
course, very important to underline that the BITs that exist today were executed by 
the Member States before their accession to the Community, putting aside several 
exceptions. 
3.2 Exclusive Competence for the Investment Policy and the 
Competence for Dispute Settlement after Lisbon 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, FDI has been included in the area 
of the CCP as an exclusive EU competence14. Pursuant to Article 207 of the TFEU, 
“The [CCP] shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to […] 
foreign direct investment […].” In line with the new exclusive competence, the 
European Commission proposed a regulation establishing transitional arrangements 
for BITs between Member States and third states (the “Regulation”)15. The need for 
transitional provisions mainly arise from the fact that BITs executed by the Member 
                                                
9 European Commission Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee. Upgrading the EU 
Investment Policy. Brussels, 30 May 2006. 
10 UNCTAD. Database,  http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx. 
11 Poland is the only EU Member State that has not signed the ICSID Convention. 
12 Article 351, TFEU. 
13 See, European Court of Justice, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of 
Austria, Case C-205/06 [2009]; Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of 
Sweden, Case C-249/06 [2009] and Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of 
Finland, Case C-118/07 [2009]. 
14 Bungenberg, Marc. 2010. Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. In 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2010 edited by Christoph Herrmann and 
Jörg Philipp Terhechte. Springer: Berlin. Pp. 123 – 151.  
15 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment treaties between Member 
States and third countries, COM(2010) 344, 2010/0197 (COD). 
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States will in fact remain in force, at least until the EU BITs replace them entirely in 
the future. Thus, this proposal aims to clarify the legal status of these national BITs. 
It “establishes the framework and conditions to empower Member States to enter 
into negotiations with a third country with a view to modifying an existing bilateral 
agreement relating to investment”.16 
Nonetheless, it could be claimed that the exact scope of the EU competence, even 
though broader in comparison with the pre-Lisbon situation, is not precisely laid out. 
It is, however, clear that the new competence covers areas such as market access, 
post-establishment standards of treatment, performance requirements and investor-
state dispute settlement provisions17. Since dispute settlement provisions are an 
exclusive competence of the EU (unless otherwise specified by the Treaties)18, the 
DSMs established by the future EU BITs (and/or any extensive trade agreement 
executed as a mixed agreement) will, in any case, function between the EU and third 
states. With its Communication Towards a comprehensive European international 
investment policy19, the Commission explicitly underlined the importance of a solid 
DSM. Examining the state-state and investor-state DSMs separately, the Commission 
ensures that future trade and investment agreements will cover state-state DSMs. As 
for the investor-state dispute settlement, the Commission is evidently well aware 
that the absence of a reliable investor-state DSM “would in fact discourage investors 
and make a host economy less attractive than others”20. Therefore, it is very clear 
that the EU is intending to include an investor-state DSM for its future investment 
agreements. 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Burgstaller, Markus. 2009. Vertical Allocation of Competences for Investment Treaties in the 
European Union, Asian International Economic Law Network (AIELN) Inaugural Conference, 
Tokyo, 12 June 2009. 
18 European Court of Justice, Opinion 1/91, ECR 1-6079 [1991].  
19 Commission Communication towards a Comprehensive European International Investment 
Policy, COM(2010) 343. 
20 Ibid. 
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4 Available Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
4.1 Dispute Resolution through Amicable Settlement 
Almost all, if not in fact all, international investment treaties have their own 
provisions as to how the dispute settlement procedure should function. It is true that 
the methods may vary one way or another, but a significant portion of these treaties 
have adopted the principle of the so-called ‘amicable dispute settlement’ as the first 
and compulsory step of dispute settlement. What is meant by this principle is that 
the parties shall first put their utmost efforts into resolving the problem amicably, 
without referring the case to a dispute settlement body such as an institution or an 
ad hoc arbitral tribunal. Should these amicable efforts fail to resolve the dispute, 
then the parties may or may not make recourse to the determined dispute 
settlement methods. In fact, even though it does have exceptions21, dispute 
settlement should normally be understood in a much wider context – the first step 
being the amicable settlement and the second being the dispute settlement through 
arbitration. 
Amicable settlement can be conducted through various ways: the negotiations can 
be bilateral, through mediation or conciliation; basically any way that the parties see 
fit, as long as it resolves the dispute and it remains informal and between the 
parties. In fact, many of the relatively small disputes, at least in investment disputes 
within the scope of a BIT, can be easily tackled by such means. However, there might 
be some major disputes that parties fail to agree or compromise by amicable means. 
This is where the second step, or dispute settlement by arbitration, introduces itself. 
4.2 Dispute Settlement through Arbitration 
4.2.1 State-State Dispute Settlement 
Traditionally speaking, the initial concept of dispute settlement in international law 
was limited to state-state dispute settlement, in which a dispute would be resolved 
between two conflicting states22. Private non-state actors were seen to entirely lack 
the capability of acting as an international law actor. Even though it was recently 
established, the WTO DSM23 would pose as an example. It is only a state-state 
mechanism, where a private party is not directly entitled to file a case against a state 
on its own. The home state of such a private party, however, can file a case against 
the state that is allegedly in breach of a WTO rule. This system, even though 
significant, fails to provide a direct remedy for the private parties who are, in most 
cases, more directly affected by the breach than the state of the investor itself. 
Additionally, it is of course possible to file a case against the state at the tribunals or 
courts of the state concerned. This, however, is looked upon with suspicion by 
                                                
21 Reed, Lucy, Paulsson, Jan and Blackaby, Nigel. 2011. Guide to ICSID Arbitration, Second 
Edition. Bedfordshire, United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International. Also see, Douglas, Zachary. 
2009. The International Law of Investment Claims. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
22 Supra note 3, UNCTAD, 2003. 
23 As established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes. January 1995. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm. 
  Günes Ünüvar  
 
15 
private parties, since the impartiality of the courts of a state can be rather 
untrustworthy when one of the parties is the state in dispute. 
According to the UNCTAD, there are some reasons why state-state dispute 
settlement is not preferable for private investors. First of all, the decision whether or 
not the home state should act upon the request of the private investor belongs to 
the home state. Therefore, a state can decide not to bring any action against the 
host state, refusing to establish diplomatic protection. A state may wish to refrain 
from acting against the host state due to bigger international relations concerns. In 
connection with this, it should be underlined that even relatively small claims need 
the direct involvement and action of the state, making the smallest investor-state 
dispute a state-state dispute. It is also a situation undesired diplomatically and 
economically for both states and the investor. Assuming, conversely, that the home 
state agrees to bring an action against the host state, it is still far from being obliged 
to transfer the proceeds of the claim to the investor24. In the case of international 
companies that may have established in more than one state, there are some 
outstanding hardships arising from the need to determine the nationality of the 
company (hence, the home state)25. 
A brief observation of the reasons listed above will justify why many investors have 
the tendency to refuse and stand clear of state-state dispute settlement, and why a 
more effective mechanism was needed. It was the increasing private involvement in 
economic life and the need for an impartial and direct dispute settlement that gave 
acceleration to the necessity to provide private parties with the entitlement to certain 
direct rights and protection, in case of disputes arising between them and the states 
they are conducting business transactions with and investing in. 
4.2.2 Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
As far as the drawback of the state-state DSMs are concerned, BITs are invaluable 
international tools providing reliable provisions for foreign investors for many 
decades. Under a BIT, the investor is protected against expropriation and 
repatriation, provided with a protection against discrimination, as well as an 
assurance of the MFN principle and national treatment are several examples that 
may be, by default, found in almost every BIT executed between states. Most BITs 
give the opportunity to an investor-state DSM. 
Investor-state dispute settlement is also an accurate mechanism that encourages the 
investors to invest in a particular state. In addition to the reasons given above, 
bringing a dispute to the national courts of that state is not as reliable as dispute 
settlement through arbitration, which is expected to be relatively more objective 
than the national courts of a state that the investor is to take judicial action against. 
Therefore, an international arbitration mechanism in that sense is necessary and it is 
more than likely that the EU BITs will and should include an arbitration-based DSM. 
Unlike what has been pointed out by some scholars, the EU in fact has expressed a 
willingness to include an investor-state DSM in its future BITs both in its Commission 
                                                
24 Jennings and Watts. 1992. Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume 1. Harlow, Essex: 
Longman, 1992. 
25 Supra note 3, UNCTAD, 2003. 
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and Regulation proposals, as well as other various instruments throughout the last 
years26. In the Commission Communication, the importance of investor-state dispute 
settlement is emphasized: “Investor-state dispute settlement […] is such an 
established feature of investment agreements that its absence would in fact 
discourage investors and make a host economy less attractive than others. […] 
[F]uture EU agreements including investment protection should include investor-state 
dispute settlement.” 27 
It is apparent that the question of what the EU BITs would include within this 
investor-state DSM needs a fulfilling answer. As we will specifically focus on below, 
there are several possibilities that the EU BITs could theoretically include as these 
possibilities stand as of today, and there are some that could be utilized in the 
future. The reason underlying this point is important: some of the most important 
and widely utilized mechanisms established and currently functioning are not 
compatible with the legal identity of the EU. To illustrate and point out the most 
controversial subject, the ICSID Convention can only be signed by the Member States 
of the World Bank or parties of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The 
EU is not a state and, in any case, does not qualify for these options28. Whether or 
not that automatically removes the possibility of the EU BITs being able to contain 
ICSID arbitration should be clarified. A variety of other institutional arbitration 
alternatives, as well as ad hoc arbitral tribunal mechanisms will also be inspected. 
4.2.2.1 Dispute Settlement through Ad Hoc Arbitration 
Ad hoc arbitration refers to arbitration by which disputes arising between two 
parties, in our case from investment disputes, are settled by the parties through 
arbitral tribunals established by them. In other words, parties of a BIT may agree to 
settle the disputes arising from their investment relations through arbitration by a 
tribunal containing arbitrators chosen by them; governed by rules determined by the 
parties, usually via the arbitrators appointed. Thus, overall, the parties are 
responsible for selecting the arbitrators, the procedure and the administrative 
support29. The agreement between the parties is considered to be the basis of 
jurisdiction and composition of an arbitral tribunal30. 
Such flexibility and freedom of choice granted to the parties within an ad hoc 
arbitration context naturally have its drawbacks. First of all, since the basis of the 
arbitration depends on the agreement concluded between the parties, the bargaining 
power and therefore the content of the agreement might place one of the parties on 
a higher ground31. This situation will inevitably affect the arbitration principles 
adopted. Such risk may damage the credibility of arbitration and may cause grave 
consequences, given that the decisions given by these arbitral tribunals are final. 
Another problem with the ad hoc tribunals is that deciding on the nature of the 
dispute, the applicable law and the procedure might take a long time, especially if 
the dispute is grave and is considered to be crucial by the parties. Selection of 
                                                
26 Supra note 4, Reinisch, 2010; supra note 2, Commission Memorandum, 2010. 
27 Supra note 20, Commission Communication COM (2010) 343. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Supra note 3, UNCTAD, 2003. 
30 Sutton, D; Kendall, J and Gill, Judith. 1997. Russell on Arbitration, Twenty-First Edition. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, pg. 109 – 175. 
31 Supra note 3, UNCTAD, 2003. 
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arbitrators, too, is known to be challenging since they are appointed by the parties. 
An arbitrator appointed by one of the parties might be considered unreliable by the 
other party, since the judicial behaviour of the arbitrators might be considered as 
‘advocating’ of the parties rather than dispute settlers32. 
Parties, of course, always have the alternative of choosing various methods of 
institutional arbitration (provided that they fulfill the preconditions). In any case, 
current ad hoc arbitration practice is mostly based on uniform rules. Appointment of 
arbitrators, pursuant to most BITs, is still conducted by the parties; but there are 
several predetermined sets of rules for the disposal of parties to be used for an 
investment dispute. The utilization of these rules, however, depends entirely on the 
parties as they are free not to include them in their agreements. 
In the following subsections, we will examine some of the most commonly used ad 
hoc arbitration mechanisms such as UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration and the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and envisage their compatibility for future EU BITs. 
A. UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration 
UNCITRAL acts as the legal body of the UN in the field of international trade law 
since its establishment and is conducting its work in various fields, inter alia, 
international arbitration related to international trade law. In 1976, UNCITRAL 
published its Rules of Arbitration33. By their nature, the Rules of Arbitration are not 
limited to any specific type of commercial dispute but extend their scope to 
practically any commercial dispute, therefore including investment disputes. 
Rules of Arbitration can be used both in ad hoc arbitrations and administered 
arbitrations, but the majority of the cases in which UNCITRAL Rules were used are ad 
hoc arbitrations; especially where the parties have agreed to submit disputes to 
arbitration under these rules34. In the last three decades, these rules are consistently 
being referred to in BITs, as well as multilateral investment treaties. Along with the 
ICSID, UNCITRAL is one of the DSMs that are most commonly referred to for 
investment disputes. According to a UNCTAD report published in 2010, out of 357 
known disputes, 225 were submitted to ICSID, whereas 91 of them were settled 
under UNCITRAL Rules35. 
The Rules of Arbitration have been thoroughly reviewed from 2006 to 2010 by a 
specialist Working Group on International Arbitration. On 25 June 2010, the final 
text of the revised Rules of Arbitration (hereinafter “2010 Rules”) was adopted. 
Currently, the 2010 Rules are in force and shall apply to future dispute settlement 
cases where UNCITRAL Rules are referred to. 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules. UN General 
Assembly Resolution 31/98, 28 April 1976. 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html. 
34 Levine, Judith. 2011. Navigating the Parallel Universe of Investor-State Arbitrations under the 
UNCITRAL Rules. In Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration edited by Chester 
Brown and Kate Miles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
35 UNCTAD. 2011. Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note 
No. 1. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20103_en.pdf. 
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- Eligibility: Can the EU use UNCITRAL rules? 
The first and foremost question to be answered is the question of eligibility. 
In other words, a clarification as to who can refer to these rules in their 
agreements, and by whom these rules can be used is necessary. Pursuant to 
Article 1 (1) of the 2010 Rules: “Where parties have agreed that disputes 
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual 
or not, shall be referred to arbitration under the [Arbitration Rules], then such 
disputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such 
modification as the parties may agree.” 
First of all, in comparison to the previous version of the Rules, the scope of 
the article has been remarkably broadened: pursuant to previous Article 1, a 
written reference was required36 for the parties to refer to the Rules. Now 
however, within the defined legal relationship of the parties, a reference to 
UNCITRAL Rules can be made - contract-based or not. This definitely 
encompasses the investor-state disputes arising from a treaty, but now is not 
limited to them37. Second, and probably the most important fact is, as is the 
case for both the 2010 Rules and the original Rules of Arbitration, parties 
who are eligible to refer to the UNCITRAL Rules have not been limited to any 
specific type: it can be the states, international organizations or the private 
actors possessing the right to bring a claim pursuant to international law. 
The wording of the Rules only refers to ‘parties’, opening a way for this 
interpretation. Additionally, there are no limits whatsoever based on 
nationality. 
Within the EU context, the eligibility to refer to UNCITRAL Rules surprisingly 
seems to be a source of misinterpretation, especially for specific institutions 
of the Union. Following the Regulation proposal and the Communication of 
the Commission, the European Parliament prepared two resolutions38 with a 
reference to investment policy to establish its position. With its resolution 
dated 6 May 2011, the Parliament states the following: “The European 
Parliament […] [i]s aware that the EU cannot use existing [ICSID] and 
[UNCITRAL] dispute settlement mechanisms since the EU as such is a member 
of neither organization; calls on the EU to include a chapter on dispute 
settlement in each new EU investment treaty in line with reforms suggested 
in [the] resolution […].”39 
It would not be wrong to say that the resolution reflects an unexpected point 
of view in terms of eligibility of UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration. According to 
the Parliament, since the EU is not “a member of [UNCITRAL]” it is not able to 
use the Rules of Arbitration. The Commission, however, sets its focus almost 
exclusively on the problems arising due to the current ICSID Convention and 
                                                
36 Supra note 34, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976. 
37 Supra note 35, Levine, 2011. 
38 Resolution 2010/2203(INI) of the European Parliament of 6 May 2011 on the Future 
European International Investment Policy, and Resolution 2010/0197 (COD) of the European 
Parliament of 10 May 2011 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements 
between Member States and Third Countries. 
39 Ibid, 2010/2203(INI) of the European Parliament of 6 May 2011. 
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the EU’s eligibility to ICSID with various instruments, including the Regulation 
proposal and its Communication40. There are only few public references to 
UNCITRAL by the Commission, and practically none regarding the 
incompatibility of this particular DSM. 
It is hard to determine why and how the Parliament came to the conclusion 
that being a member of UNCITRAL is a pre-requisite to be able to use the 
UNCITRAL rules, and we strongly disagree with this outcome of the 
Resolution dated 6 May 2011 in that regard. Indeed, given the legal context 
of the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration, we are convinced there are no 
restrictions whatsoever, at least as far as the EU is concerned, with regard to 
using these rules and including them in future EU BITs. This was also 
underlined by several scholars41. Additionally, UNCITRAL very expressly 
finalized the argument on this issue of compatibility, stating that “[n]othing 
in the Rules limits their use to nationals of States which are Member States of 
the Commission.”42 Therefore, the EU is entitled to use the Rules of 
Arbitration if it wishes so. 
- Outcome: Can (or should) the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration be 
used? 
As was pointed to above, the EU is without doubt legally eligible to use the 
UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration within the legal status quo. The Rules of 
Arbitration provide for an extensive and accurate procedural framework, 
despite the current gaps and criticism directed to several aspects of 
UNCITRAL arbitration43. 
The question of capability should be accompanied with the question of 
preferability: why should the EU include the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration? 
The answer to this question is simple, because currently UNCITRAL stands as 
the best alternative. UNCITRAL is the second most common method used, 
including by the Member States within the provisions of their national BITs. 
Even though an extensive inspection will be provided below, it is sufficient to 
say at this stage that, since the EU is unable to use ICSID arbitration pursuant 
to the current provisions on eligibility, it seems to us that UNCITRAL should, 
at least in a transitional manner, be used until the provisional obstacles are 
overcome with the ICSID arbitration. Following a resolution, UNCITRAL can 
always be preserved as an alternative option. 
                                                
40 Supra notes 16 and 20, the Regulation Proposal COM(2010) 344, 2010/0197 (COD) and the 
Commission Communication COM(2010) 343. 
41 Supra note 5, Shan and Zhang, 2011. 
42 UNCITRAL. FAQ – UNCITRAL and Private Disputes /Litigation. 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration_faq.html 
43 Supra note 35, Levine, 2011. 
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B.  Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes of the PCA and a 
Comparative Approach to the UNCITRAL and the PCA 
The PCA offers a permanent framework for arbitral tribunals established to resolve 
specific disputes44. Under the PCA, there are several sets of rules of procedure 
depending on the notion of the parties or the nature of the dispute: for instance, a 
set of rules regulate the dispute settlement between two states45 whereas another set 
regulates the disputes between two parties of which only one is a state.46 As for the 
investment disputes and investor-state dispute settlement, however, one needs to 
focus on the optional rules for two parties of which at least one of the parties is a 
private entity, since the others regulate different disputes and procedures (such as 
rules regulating disputes between two states or an international organization and a 
state). 
The PCA rules offer a similar framework with UNCITRAL for the conduct of arbitration 
between a state and a private party. The main difference between UNCITRAL and PCA 
is that PCA offers an (limited) institutional support by the IBPC, however the nature 
of the support is administrative. This limitation prevents the PCA from being a “fully-
fledged institutional system of arbitration, but [it] offers parties an ad hoc arbitration 
to use as the arbitration agreement between them.”47 
The UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration, furthermore, clearly refer to the PCA under 
several of its provisions, and states that parties to the dispute can appoint the 
Secretary-General of PCA as an appointing authority of arbitrators, should they desire 
to do so. In any case, if the parties fail to appoint arbitrators within thirty days, any 
party is free to refer to the Secretary-General to appoint the arbitrators48. It can be 
seen from this provision that the administrative support provided by the PCA is in 
fact acknowledged by the Rules of Arbitration. As was mentioned in the previous 
section, the administrative (or, in general, institutional) support is what UNCITRAL 
lacks, and such a relationship between UNCITRAL rules and the Permanent Court 
helps both systems to complement each other. 
It is not only the Rules of Procedure that make a cross-reference, since it has been 
stated that the PCA have “adopted and adapted the UNCITRAL Rules.”49. In fact, the 
Introduction of Optional Rules of the PCA expressly refers to the UNCITRAL Rules of 
Arbitration. The reference also marks the main differences between the two: These 
Rules supersede the ‘1962 Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of 
International Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State.’ The Rules 
are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules […]”.50 
                                                
44 Permanent Court of Arbitration. Structure, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1039. 
45 Permanent Court of Arbitration. Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for 
Arbitrating Disputes between Two States, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/2STATENG.pdf. 
46 Ibid. Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration Disputes between Two 
Parties of Which Only One is a State, http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/1STATENG.pdf. This 
set of rules will be hereinafter referred to as “Optional Rules”. 
47 Supra note 3, UNCTAD 2003. 
48 UNCITRAL Rules, 2010. 
49 Supra note 35, Levine, 2011. 
50 Supra note 46, PCA Optional Rules for Two States. 
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Besides the comparison provided above, PCA and UNCITRAL systems also have a 
relationship when considered together as a single entity. The PCA is known to have 
administered many cases under the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration, and the number 
of cases administered is gradually increasing51. 
Due to its almost identical nature to the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration, whether or 
not the Optional Rules of the PCA should be provided as an option under the BITs 
does not stand as a prominent question to be tackled in order to construct a DSM. In 
our opinion, the real focus with regard to PCA should be on the administrative 
support it provides for ad hoc arbitral tribunals. 
Administrative support through the PCA’s International Bureau provides various 
advantages on different matters such as cost reduction, lightening the burden of 
arbitrators in terms of administrative tasks, providing support, running the case and 
managing the deposits. The PCA also benefits from qualified staff, particularly 
experienced in the matters handled by the arbitral tribunals within the PCA 
administration52. Such administrative assistance, without doubt, would benefit the 
investors and the states (or the EU) to hasten the process. 
To finalize, we consider the PCA to be an additional administrative mechanism that 
could be attached to a possible ad hoc arbitration clause in the future EU BITs, to 
strengthen the reliability of ad hoc arbitration. Even though the EU is not a party to 
any of the PCA founding conventions53; the PCA does not limit its scope only to 
states as is evident from the numerous optional rules designated to cover different 
parties. Yet whether the EU would be considered as a ‘state’ or an ‘international 
organization’ is a crucial question that needs answering, because the optional rules 
for international organizations and private parties, as well as the optional rules for 
international organizations and states define the international organization as an 
‘intergovernmental organization’54. The EU, alternatively, forms a “supranational 
union” in principle55. Should this question find its answer in the affirmative, such 
administrative and institutional support would be beneficial for the future ad hoc 
tribunals where the EU or a European investor is a party. 
C.  Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
The AISCC (or “the Institute”) was established in 1917 as an independent section of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and is among the most commonly used 
investment DSMs. Very similar to the PCA, AISCC provides for administrative support 
and arbitration. 
With regard to the eligibility of AISCC, the Institute does not provide different sets of 
arbitration based on legal personality. That is to say, the rules (and/or administrative 
                                                
51 In 2005, there were only 8 cases based on BITs and Multilateral Investment Treaties known 
that have been administered by the PCA according to UNCITRAL rules. This number increased 
to 38 in 2010. See Levine, 2011. 
52 Supra note 35, Levine, 2011, pg. 384. 
53 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and 1907 Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1899. 
54 Supra note 47, PCA Optional Rules for International Organizations and States. 
55 Kiljunen, Kimmo. 2004. The European Constitution in the Making. The Center for European 
Policy Studies. Brussels: CEPS. 
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support) are applicable to any dispute as long as parties agree to include AISCC in 
their investment agreement, whether they are states or other international legal 
actors. Parallel to this uniformity of rules, the Rules of Arbitration of the Institute 
only refer to ‘parties’, avoiding mentioning terms such as ‘state’, ‘international 
organization’ or other possible international actors that may execute such 
investment agreements, thus making it eligible for any party in so far as they are 
parties to an agreement from which disputes arise56. 
D. The International Court of Arbitration (ICA) of the ICC 
The ICC Court of Arbitration was first established in 1923, which was then renamed 
the International Court of Arbitration in 198957. 
The framework provided by the ICA does not differ from the PCA or the AISCC to a 
large extent. According to Article 1 of the Rules of Arbitration, the “[ICA] does not 
itself resolve disputes” but it merely administers arbitrations. It should also be 
mentioned point that the administrative support provided by the ICA is conducted 
only pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration; therefore the administration and the 
set of rules provided there within are attached together58. 
Any ‘party’ that has “agreed to submit to arbitration under the Rules” may benefit 
from the ICC system59. ICC, like AISCC, avoids limiting the arbitration mechanism to 
the disposal of states or any other certain international actor. This eventually means 
that ICC Arbitration is a viable option for the future EU BITs, provided that parties (of 
a future EU BIT) agree to submit their disputes to the ICC. 
4.2.2.2 Dispute Settlement through Institutional Arbitration: The ICSID 
Besides the ad hoc arbitration and the alternatives provided under its scope, the 
other way around the investor-state dispute settlement through arbitration passes 
through the institutions. Under this system of dispute settlement, the dispute is in 
principle submitted to an institution handling both the administrative and judicial 
proceedings in accordance with its constitutive instrument. Therefore, the institution 
referred to in case of a dispute will not merely support the arbitral proceedings in an 
administrative standpoint but will in fact conduct the judgment as well. 
Institutional arbitration is assumed to be a more reliable means of dispute resolution 
in comparison with the ad hoc system60, for the institution which the case is referred 
to is in charge of most of the initiatives granted to the parties under an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal. This inevitably means less flexibility and therefore a relatively 
smaller role for the influence of bargaining powers of parties playing a role and 
giving higher ground to one of them in the process. Another interesting point 
connected to this outcome is that since institutional arbitration is likely to have been 
                                                
56 Article 1 of the Rules of Arbitration of the AISCC. 
57 Derains, Yves and Schwartz, Eric A. 2005. A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration. The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
58 International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration. Introduction to 
Arbitration – ICC arbitration: distinctive features,  
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4089/index.html.  
59 Article 6 (1), Rules of Arbitration of ICC. 
60 Supra note 3, UNCTAD, 2003, pg. 14. 
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constructed upon a multilateral instrument (ie, the ICSID Convention for ICSID 
arbitration), a greater sensitivity to the interests of developing countries may be 
shown61. 
Statistically speaking, institutionalized arbitration has a clear dominance over ad hoc 
arbitration. Namely the ICSID, the only institutionalized arbitration mechanism, had 
almost as many cases as was handled by the rest of the DSMs in 2010, and when the 
cases resolved by the Chambers of Commerce is added to this number62, little effort 
is needed to figure out what the most favoured method is for the parties in terms of 
investor-state dispute settlement. Despite these figures may vary from year to year63, 
the fact that institutional arbitration is always a common preference stands 
unchanging. 
From an EU perspective, the institutional arbitration stands as the focal point and the 
most controversial discussion which needs to be tackled. The following subsections 
will examine ICSID Arbitration in detail and inspect its compatibility, as well as other 
problems associated with institutional arbitration. 
A. An Overview of ICSID Arbitration  
The initial steps for the ICSID (or the Centre) were taken in 1961, which led to the 
creation of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. The 
idea which engulfed the purpose of the entire process was that the parties, even 
though with certain divergences in thought, believed that “the best way to provide 
satisfactory legal infrastructure for the promotion of international private investment 
flows would be providing effective procedures for impartial settlement of disputes 
rather than by seeking multilateral agreement on the establishment of general 
substantive standards.64” 
Over the years, the initiative turned into a global one and on 18 March 1965, the 
ICSID Convention was opened for signature and ratification. It became operational on 
14 October 196665. As of 2012, the ICSID Convention has 158 signatories66.  
Structurally, there are several reasons that make the ICSID stand aside from the rest 
of the systems developed to provide an alternative to dispute settlement. First of all, 
the ICSID forms the first and only institutional DSM designated specifically for 
disputes arising from investment protection and promotion agreements67. 
Furthermore, the ICSID conducts the judgments and the administrative procedures, 
unlike the models under ad hoc arbitration. 
                                                
61 Ibid. 
62 Supra note 36, UNCTAD, 2011. 
63 See Peterson, Luke. 2006. Investment Treaty News: 2006 – A year in review. 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_year_review_2006.pdf. 
64 Schreuer, Malintoppi, Reinisch and Sinclair. 2009. The ICSID Convention - A Commentary, 
Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
65 ICSID. About ICSID, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&p
ageName=AboutICSID_Home. 
66 South Sudan has ratified the agreement on 20 April 2012. See ICSID. 2012. South Sudan 
Signs and Ratifies to ICSID Convention. 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&Pa
geType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement105. 
67 Supra note 3, UNCTAD, 2003, pg. 36. 
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Within the context of a general framework, another feature of ICSID arbitration worth 
attention is the matter of jurisdiction. The ICSID Convention has substantive rules 
that strengthen the juridical presence of the Centre. The Convention states that 
“[c]onsent of the parties to arbitration under [the ICSID] Convention shall […] be 
deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy”68, which 
means that once parties accept ICSID jurisdiction, any other remedy becomes 
automatically unavailable, including diplomatic protection69. It should also be noted 
that once parties give consent to ICSID arbitration, they will not be able to withdraw 
their consent unilaterally70. 
B. The Issue of Eligibility 
Given that the ICSID officially stands as the most commonly used dispute settlement 
system with a structure particularly designated for investment disputes, solid 
arbitration jurisprudence and a remarkable international reputation, it would be 
surprising for competent authorities not to consider including it as an alternative for 
a DSM. This is very much the case for the EU – in the current international legal 
framework, the ICSID could undoubtedly be considered as a necessary addition to a 
future EU BIT. After all, EU BITs are expected to provide investor protection at least at 
the level of Member States’ BITs, so that the investors would not lose any protection 
they have possessed within the context of national BITs. What the EU BITs should 
additionally do is to improve this credibility and protection; therefore not including 
the ICSID (at least in the draft agreement) could hardly be justified. 
This may be the logical outcome – however, the matter goes beyond logic. Article 67 
of the ICSID Convention states that the “Convention shall be open for signature on 
behalf of States members of the [World] Bank. It shall also be open for signature on 
behalf of any other State which is a party to the Statute of International Court of 
Justice […]”71 The situation is multi-layered: the Convention can be signed by a 
‘state’, and this state has to be a member of the World Bank or the signatory of the 
Statute of International Court of Justice. 
Examining this requirement from the EU’s perspective brings about several 
problems. First of all, the EU is not a state. Its functions, activities and competences 
are based on the principle of conferral72 and not a notion of sovereignty, despite the 
deceiving similarities it has with a state73. Additionally, becoming a member of the 
World Bank, pursuant to the IBRD Articles of Agreement, requires the membership of 
the IMF in advance74. This therefore makes reference to the Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF Agreement”), which under Article II, provides 
membership only for states75. The EU, currently, is not a signatory of the Statute of 
                                                
68 Article 26, ICSID Convention. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Article 25, ICSID Convention. 
71 Article 67, ICSID Convention. 
72 Article 3 of the Treaty of the European Union. Also see Mathijsen, Pierre. 2010. A Guide to 
European Law, Tenth Edition. London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell. pg. 28. 
73 For an article in relation to the definition of a “state”, Craven, Matthew. 2010. Statehood, 
Self-determination and Recognition. In International Law edited by Malcolm D. Evans, Third 
Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg. 204 – 251. 
74 Article II, Section 1(b) Articles of Agreement of the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). 
75 Article II, Section 2, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
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International Court of Justice either. Therefore, this means that the EU is not eligible 
to become a signatory of the ICSID Convention, since the participation of a ‘regional 
association’ is not possible76. 
Eventually, the practical consequence of this legal situation is that even if the EU 
includes an ICSID Arbitration clause to its future EU BITs, an asymmetrical situation 
will arise concerning the protection of investors. That is to say, whereas a European 
investor will be able to bring a claim against the third state at the ICSID (provided 
that the third state is a member of the ICSID), a foreign investor will not be able to 
bring a claim against the EU77. Under such circumstances, it is not hard to predict 
that no third state would willingly accept the inclusion of an ICSID provision in a 
prospective BIT executed with the EU. 
C.  Negotiating a Compatible ICSID Convention 
The impossibility of including the ICSID in a future EU BIT has been constantly 
highlighted by many scholars78, and it was further underlined that if there is any 
possibility for the ICSID to be included in such a BIT, the only possible method of 
doing so is to amend the ICSID Convention in such a way that it can also cover the 
possibility of a non-state actor (for instance, an international organization) becoming 
a party to the ICSID. Whereas it is considered to be a minor problem by some79, 
another group of scholars consider it to be unlikely80. 
Theoretically, the ICSID Convention is in fact eligible for revision. Article 65 of the 
ICSID Convention states that “any Contracting State may propose amendment of 
[ICSID] Convention”81, and Article 66 further provides that “[…]each amendment shall 
enter into force […] after […] all Contracting States have ratified, accepted or 
approved the amendment.”82 As is apparent, the only possible way to amend an ICSID 
Convention provision is a unanimous ratification by all members. Given the vast 
number of contracting parties of the Convention and combining the duration of the 
negotiations for amendment and the duration for ratification of all members, this 
process is likely to take years, if not decades. Furthermore, this is of course provided 
that all contracting parties in fact agree to such an amendment. Therefore, it could 
be argued that the theoretical possibility is obstructed by a practical impossibility.  
To further the challenge it should be recalled that, in addition to being a state, being 
a member of the World Bank is also relevant to accede to the ICSID Convention. 
Therefore, since the membership of the World Bank sets the pre-requisite of being a 
signatory of the IMF Agreement, the EU either might have to promote an amendment 
to this agreement as well83, or will have to propose an amendment to the ICSID 
                                                
76 Braun, Tillmann Rudolf. 2010. For a Complementary European Investment Protection in 
European Yearbook of International and Economic Law, edited by Marc Bungenberg, Jörn 
Griebel and Steffen Hindelang. Berlin: Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht, pg. 102; also supra note 
7, Mola, 2008. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid; supra note 4, Reinisch, 2010. 
79 Supra note 5, Shan and Zhang, 2011. 
80 Supra note 3, Reinisch, 2010. 
81 Article 65, ICSID Convention. 
82 Article 66, ICSID Convention. 
83 Bungenberg, Marc. 2008. Centralizing European BIT Making under the Lisbon Treaty. 
Biennial Interest Group Conference, Washington D.C., 13 – 15 November 2008. 
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Convention including the removal of the pre-requisite of being a member of the 
World Bank, which is, immensely challenging. 
Of course, to claim that the amendment process should not even be initiated would 
be an utterly pessimistic approach to the matter. Instead, the EU should set its 
position and work by commencing the procedure through its Member States that are 
parties to the Convention, promoting the abovementioned amendment nonetheless.  
D.  ICSID Additional Facility 
In addition to the ICSID Convention, another set of rules under the name the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules were adopted in order to administer a certain group of 
proceedings that fall out of the Convention’s scope84. Pursuant to Article 2(a) of the 
Additional Facility Rules, the Secretariat of ICSID has been granted authority to 
administer the investor-state dispute settlement proceedings in the case of 
“conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes arising 
directly out of an investment which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre 
because either the State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to 
the dispute is not a Contracting State”85. 
Therefore, the provision covers disputes arising between a state which is not a party 
to the ICSID Convention and an investor national of a party state, or between a state 
party to the ICSID Convention and an investor national of a non-party state. Parallel 
to the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules follow the state-oriented 
approach in its definitions. Therefore in the current legal framework, the EU falls out 
of the scope of the Additional Facility Rules despite the fact that it matches the ‘non-
member’ criteria. 
However, the Additional Facility Rules are much more viable for the EU in the 
absence of ICSID Arbitration within the scope of the Convention. The primary reason 
is that the amendment procedure for the Additional Facility Rules is in fact practically 
possible for the EU. According to Article 6 of the ICSID Convention, the adoption of 
the rules of procedure shall be conducted “by a majority of two-thirds of the 
members of the Administrative Council.”86 In comparison with the amendment 
procedure laid out by the Convention provisions, the adoption of rules of procedure 
is relatively simple, thus practically more achievable for the EU. Therefore, we believe 
that the following the amendment of these Additional Facility Rules the EU can in 
fact include them in its future BITs as a dispute settlement alternative since the 
necessity of becoming a party of the ICSID Convention will no longer pose an 
obstacle for the EU. 
                                                
84 ICSID. ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities. 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=RightFrame&F
romPage=Dispute%20Settlement%20Facilities&pageName=Disp_settl_facilities 
85 Article 2, ICSID Additional Facility Rules. Article 2 additionally covers disputes that do not 
arise directly from investment disputes between the aforementioned parties, and fact-finding 
proceedings under sub-paragraphs 2(b) and (c). 
86 Article 6, ICSID Convention. 
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E. Outcome 
The controversy that the ICSID Convention has caused with regard to the future EU 
BITs is already a fiercely debated topic, for it is possible to come across direct and 
indirect references to the matter in the relevant academic doctrine. As pointed out 
above, the hardships caused by the conditions put forward by the ICSID Convention 
are quite challenging to tackle. The amendment procedure is to take a long time, 
and it is not even granted that after working on such an initiative for a remarkable 
period, the amendment will actually take place.  
There is no debate on the matter that the ICSID is currently unavailable for the EU. 
However, there is no reason why the amendment process should not be launched in 
order to provide an ICSID Convention inclusion in the long run. There is no urgency 
to include ICSID Arbitration (pursuant to the Convention) at the moment, and the 
ICSID provides for additional provisions that can be utilized with relatively easy 
amendments. The EU can simultaneously pursue the revision of those rules along 
with the ICSID Convention amendment in order to provide (at least) a transitional 
institutional DSM. 
IES Working Paper 1/2012 
 
28 
5 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the Member State BITS 
BITs are intended to promote and protect investment in the contracting country by 
the counterparty investor87, even though a particular examination is necessary to 
fully comprehend the scope and intention of each. BITs have been actively exercised 
by the Member States for many decades. Germany was the first-ever state to execute 
a BIT in the world88. As of today, Member States of the EU have executed and 
concluded approximately 1,300 BITs including intra and extra-EU BITs. 
In connection with the discussion regarding the prospective DSMs for the new EU 
BITs, we consider it appropriate to continue our analysis of alternatives for a DSM in 
the future EU BITs with a close examination of the current prominent model BITs in 
Europe. It is further foreseeable that during the preparation of the EU BIT draft, the 
model BITs used by prominent Member States of the EU such as Germany, France 
and the UK will influence the negotiations to a certain extent. In fact, it is well-known 
that the models used by the European states, to various extents, reflect the Germany 
– Pakistan BIT89. It is therefore very important to investigate these model BITs to have 
a more concrete picture of what the future EU BITs would resemble. 
5.1 Common Features and Differences of German90, French91 and 
British92 BIT Models 
When the model clauses are observed, the similarities are in fact express. The 
differences, even though minor, do exist – however they do not reflect in its entirety 
a wholly different tradition of dispute settlement practice. It could be claimed that 
these facts indicate a similar, if not almost unified, practice of DSMs in the pre-
Lisbon situation. The level of proximity depends on state-state or investor-state 
dispute settlement: the former forms a more uniform practice whereas the latter 
proves to be more diverse. 
For the state-state dispute settlement, three major European systems follow an 
identical, two-layer system including an amicable settlement and the establishment 
of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, should diplomatic attempts fail to resolve the dispute. 
It should be noted that this is not exclusive to the model BITs of Germany, France 
and the UK as this applies to almost all BITs executed by Member States. 
One difference between the German and French Model BITs on state-state dispute 
settlement is that the role granted to the President of the ICJ by the German BIT is 
granted to the Secretary-General of the UN by the French BIT. The article reads: “If 
                                                
87 Sarısoy Guerin, Selen. 2010. Do the European Union’s Bilateral Investment Treaties Matter? 
The Way Forward After Lisbon. Working Document No. 333. Brussels, Belgium: Centre for 
European Policy Studies. 
88 Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic Pakistan 
concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 November 1959. 
89 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie. 2010. European Parliament Hearing on Foreign Direct 
Investment, Foreign Investment for Sustainable Development Program, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development. http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1365. 
90 2008 German Model BIT. http://italaw.com/documents/2008-GermanModelBIT.doc. 
91 2006 French Model BIT. http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf. 
92 Supra note 22, Douglas, 2009. 
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the periods specified […] have not been met, either Contracting Party […] shall invite 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization to make the necessary 
appointments.” As for the UK Model, regarding the establishment of an ad hoc 
tribunal in case of diplomatic negotiations failing to end the dispute, German and UK 
Models overlap almost entirely. 
Investor-state DSMs, however, are not as uniform as the state-state mechanism. In 
connection with the amicable settlement, the wording in the French BIT hints at a 
stronger necessity than the German BIT, since the former model states that parties 
“shall” settle, whereas the latter states that parties “should as far as possible” settle. 
This difference in wording, in this case, does not make a significant practical 
difference; but it is also very likely that the latter wording might be interpreted that 
the amicable settlement phase can be skipped. Concerning the duration of the 
amicable settlement, two differences between the German and the French Models 
should be underlined. First, the French Model allows both parties of the dispute to 
apply for arbitration. The German Model only allows the investor to submit the 
dispute to arbitration, giving a significant advantage to the investor. The second 
difference is that the French Model does not, like its German counterpart, give a 
variety of choices of institutional or ad hoc arbitration to parties; the only defined 
mechanism that can be used is the ICSID arbitration pursuant to the second 
paragraph of Article 7 of the French Model BIT. The alternatives to be provided in the 
case of the other state not being a party to the ICSID Convention are therefore 
vague. 
The UK Model BIT has a relatively different structure than the German and French 
Models. The first variation of the UK Model in fact includes the written consent of the 
parties to submit the dispute to the ICSID, unlike the French and German Models. 
Furthermore, the UK Model states that after failing to resolve the dispute on a 
national level through local remedies, either of the parties may submit to the ICSID 
for conciliation or an arbitration procedure. Conciliation here is provided as an 
alternative to arbitration on the same phase. The German and French Models, 
conversely, usually provide conciliation as the first, introductory phase in dispute 
settlement. The second version of Article 8 reflects the resemblance of the UK Model 
to other dispute settlement clauses used in different model BITs. However, unlike the 
French and German Models, the period set for amicable settlement is three months. 
5.2 National Models in the Context of Future EU BIT Dispute 
Settlement Clauses 
It can be claimed that the abovementioned analysis partially sheds some light to 
what a common EU BIT dispute settlement clause would resemble, however, further 
deduction is necessary in order to come up with a tangible outcome. As was 
illustrated above, ICSID Arbitration, at least currently, is not an option for the EU to 
include in its BITs – whereas it has been further emphasized that it forms the main 
dispute settlement alternative in all of the model BITs above. As for the other 
alternatives provided under these model BITs discussed (UNCITRAL, PCA, ICC and 
AISCC) such controversy does not exist, and therefore such specific examination 
might not be necessary. However, before tackling the legal blockade that the ICSID 
has put in front of the DSMs of the future EU BITs, it is basically impossible to 
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provide for a fully satisfactory framework and come up with a reliable and legally 
stable proposition. 
The ultimate question to be asked about the ICSID, in light of the discussion 
provided under the respective section, is not whether or not to include ICSID 
Arbitration despite the risk of asymmetrical protection (or a lack of protection, 
depending on the investor). In our opinion, the ultimate question that should be 
asked is how to include ICSID Arbitration in those EU BITs as effectively as possible 
given the current legal circumstances and the initiatives available. The EU is not (and 
currently cannot be) a member of the ICSID Convention or the World Bank, it is not a 
signatory of the Statute of the ICJ and unless the necessary amendments are 
conducted, ICSID Arbitration can never be used within the scope of an EU BIT. This is 
the sole reason why the EU cannot include an express ICSID clause in its future BITs, 
at least not in the sense that a state which is a member of the ICSID can easily do. As 
far as the ICSID is concerned, a comparative approach between the ordinary state 
model and a future EU model will fail since what is practiced by the Member States 
cannot be applied to an EU model, for the reasons discussed throughout relevant 
sections of this paper. 
Therefore, looking at the matter from another point of view, namely from the point 
of view of a state that is not an ICSID member, is more likely to provide us with the 
applicable model we are striving to construct. The model BITs provided above can 
only apply to negotiations between two states that are both members of the ICSID, 
since they assume negotiating states to be eligible to use ICSID Arbitration. The 
situation is, however, different in the case of the BITs between ICSID Member States 
and states that are not eligible to use ICSID Arbitration. 
The Germany – Albania BIT93, signed several days before the ratification of the ICSID 
Convention (14 November 1991) by the Assembly of the Republic of Albania, 
provides a striking example. Although the procedure was almost complete and the 
ratification of the ICSID Convention was a few weeks away, it was not possible for 
Albania to include an ICSID Arbitration clause in its investment treaties signed before 
the date of ratification (therefore, its date of membership). Conversely, excluding 
ICSID Arbitration from this agreement would prove to be improper, since the date of 
signature and date of membership were extremely close to each other. Given the 
situation, a transitional and conditional dispute settlement clause effective in the 
future was drafted. According to Article 11(4) of the Germany – Albania BIT, in the 
event that both parties (of the BIT) are also parties of the ICSID Convention the 
disputes arising between the parties (of the BIT) shall be subject to arbitration under 
the ICSID Convention94. Instead of including a non-conditional clause, the condition 
of membership was elaborated so that if the parties are (or become) parties of the 
ICSID Convention, it shall be eligible. Germany followed the same method with other 
states that were not members of the ICSID at the time of execution of the BIT95. 
                                                
93 The Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Albania for 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments dated 31 October 1991. 
94 Article 11(4) of the Germany – Albania BIT. 
95 Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Lithuania 
concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, dated 28 February 1992. 
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Switzerland, even though not an EU Member State, is highly associated with the 
European practice and is therefore strongly relevant to this discussion. It has 
concluded many BITs with states that are not members of the ICSID, and is known to 
have a common ad hoc arbitration practice96. Within this context, several of 
Switzerland’s BITs such as the Switzerland – Lithuania BIT97 are worth mentioning. 
Article 9(3) of this agreement states that, like the Germany – Albania BIT, “[i]n the 
event of both Contracting Parties having become members of the [ICSID Convention], 
disputes under this article may, upon the request of the investor, as an alternative to 
the procedure mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, be submitted to [the 
ICSID].”98 Other BITs concluded by Switzerland with other states that were not 
members of the ICSID at the time such as Vietnam99 and Cape Verde100 contain 
similar, if not identical, clauses. Irrespective of their membership of the ICSID, these 
conditional clauses in fact included a future ICSID Arbitration clause for the investors 
of non-members of the ICSID Convention, avoiding the necessity of revising or even 
re-negotiating BITs between these states after the non-member state becomes a 
member. 
Following this comparative analysis, we consider the illustrated method to be the 
most suitable model for a future EU BIT with regard to a possible ICSID clause. As 
was pointed out, the EU BITs can include mechanisms such as UNCITRAL, PCA, AISCC 
and ICC without any conditions and without any problems, as long as parties agree 
to do so. As for the ICSID, the situation is much more complicated, yet it is not 
impossible to resolve if such a conditional and transitional clause is included. 
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the ICSID Additional Facility can also be 
provided as an alternative without any problems, since its scope covers BITs between 
an ICSID member state and a state that is not an ICSID member. It is, of course, 
provided for that the Rules of Arbitration for the Additional Facility is amended 
accordingly to also cover international (or supranational) organizations. 
                                                
96 Dolzer, Rudolf and Stevens, Margrete. 1995. The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes – Bilateral Investment Treaties. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pg. 152-153. 
97 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Lithuania concerning the 
Reciprocal Promotion or Protection of Investments, dated 23 December 1992.  
98 Ibid, Article 9. 
99 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, dated 3 July 1992. 
100 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Cape Verde concerning 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, dated 28 October 1991. 
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6 Conclusion 
The radical shift of competences presented by the Lisbon Treaty evidently brings 
about radical responsibilities, consequences and duties for the EU. BITs, regardless 
who executes them, remain and probably will remain the backbone of investment 
protection in the absence of multilateral rules, and as was demonstrated in the pre-
Lisbon period, the Union constantly had the urge to undertake the initiative to 
establish a Europe-wide, unified practice applicable for all Member States101. The 
initial and the ultimate challenge remains the same: the establishment of reliable, 
credible and stronger protection for the investors and a unified, foreseeable practice 
that will evolve in time and by experience. It should be underlined that no current 
functioning EU common policy was successfully established overnight, and a strong, 
stationary FDI policy (in fact, CCP in general) cannot be established unless the EU is 
determined to take the risks and necessary bold steps. 
Given that no such regional initiative was ever attempted before, the EU BITs are 
unique by nature and completely new to academicians and practitioners. In the 
above sections, we have attempted to clarify some of the most outstanding issues 
that have already arisen or might arise in the future. BITs have a global 
acknowledgement and a more or less settled, predictable practice; however the 
inclusion of a supranational union (which has already proven to be peculiar by all 
means) as an international actor and party is likely to disrupt this state-oriented 
perception. Inevitably attached to such uniqueness, dispute resolution mechanisms 
to be installed within this new EU context are by no means unproblematic. 
The density of the controversy varies, however. The problems should not be 
overstated – as was demonstrated, independent from the parties and their legal 
identity; some of the DSMs are in fact responsive to the current legal status quo. For 
instance, the so-called ‘state-state’ DSM is likely to be included in the future EU BITs 
probably only with minor conceptual differences (to illustrate, as far as the EU is 
concerned, it may be called the EU-state dispute settlement). Furthermore, although 
it did cause a rather unexpected confusion for several institutional bodies such as 
the European Parliament, UNCITRAL can be adopted without any modification. 
Likewise, institutions providing for optional rules and administrative support such as 
PCA, AISCC and ICC remain relatively untroubled. It is likely that these mechanisms 
will be prioritized by the EU until the time when deeper legal questions, such as 
ICSID Arbitration, are fortunately resolved. 
ICSID Arbitration presents a multi-branched legal obscurity: neither the Convention 
nor the Additional Facility is presently utilizable. As for the Convention, a long and 
stressful period for the EU is on the horizon; it is undoubtedly one of the most 
challenging legal problems that the EU has assumed. The ICSID Convention is a 
successful multilateral convention with remarkable participation from states, and the 
vast number of signatories of this Convention is probably the primary problem, 
given that all signatories must ratify any proposed amendment that might eventually 
let the EU participate. The success of the ICSID is apparently a disadvantage for the 
EU in the short (or long?) run, but should this troublesome phase elapse with 
                                                
101 Supra note 5, Shan and Zhang, 2011. 
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affirmative consequences, the success will supplement the EU BITs and ensure their 
credibility - provided that no unexpected problems arise in the future. The ICSID 
Additional Facility, however, deserves a more optimistic approach. With a relatively 
easy amendment procedure, it can be included in the EU BIT framework and serve as 
a stepping-stone towards the ultimate target of the ICSID Convention. 
It was one of the primary efforts of this paper to extract the issues presented above 
from their abstract nature and put forward a solid, tangible layout by which the 
problems and the proposed solution alternatives can be clearly observed. Thus, the 
current practice (including the practice of the Member States) proves to be invaluable 
data to deduce and craft an EU framework. To further such efforts and finalize this 
objective, and in light of the analysis provided throughout the paper, we would like 
to propose a feasible dispute settlement model for future EU BITs: 
Settlement of Disputes between Contracting Parties 
1. Disputes between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of this treaty shall (alternative, ‘should as far as possible’) be 
settled by the competent authorities102 of the two Contracting Parties; 
2. If a dispute cannot thus be settled, it shall upon the request of the either 
Contracting Party be submitted to an arbitral tribunal; 
3. The arbitral tribunal shall be constituted for each case as follows: each 
Contracting Party shall appoint one member, and these two members shall 
agree upon a national of a third State (by which, should be understood, a 
national of a state other than the EU Member States and the other 
Contracting Party) as their chairman to be appointed by the competent 
authorities of the two Contracting Parties. The members should be appointed 
within two months, and the chairman within three months, from the date on 
which either Contracting Party has informed the other Contracting Party that 
it wants to submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal; 
4. If the periods specified in paragraph (3) have not been observed, either 
Contracting Party may, in the absence of any other relevant agreement, invite 
the President of the International Court of Justice (alternatively, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations) to make the necessary appointments. If the 
President is a national of either Contracting Parties (a national of any of the 
EU Member States and the other Contracting Party) or if he is otherwise 
prevented from discharging the said function, the Vice-President should make 
the necessary appointments. If the Vice-President is a national of either 
Contracting Party (a national of any of the EU Member States and the other 
Contracting Party) or if he, too, is prevented from discharging the said 
function, the Member of the Court next in seniority who is not a national of 
either Contracting State (the same conditions provided for the President and 
the Vice-President in terms of nationality apply) should make the necessary 
appointments; 
                                                
102 The EU, strictly speaking, does not have a government in the sense that a state does. What 
should be understood by such a term are the executive actors of the EU, such as the 
Commission. 
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5. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its decisions by a majority of votes. Its 
decisions shall be binding. Each Contracting Party shall bear the cost of its 
own member and of its representatives in the arbitration proceedings; the 
cost of the chairman and the remaining costs shall be borne in equal parts by 
the Contracting States. The arbitral tribunal is competent to make a different 
regulation concerning costs. In all other respects, the arbitral tribunal shall 
determine its own procedural rules.103 
Settlement of Disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party 
1. Disputes concerning investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of 
the other Contracting Party shall (alternatively, should as far as possible) be 
settled amicably between the parties to the dispute; 
2. If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date on which it was 
raised by one of the parties to the dispute, it shall, at the request of the investor 
of the other Contracting Party, be submitted to arbitration. The two Contracting 
Parties hereby declare that they consent to the dispute being submitted to one of 
the following DSMs of the investor’s choosing: 
a. In the event of both Contracting Parties having become a party, arbitration 
under the auspices of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and National of Other States of 18 March 1965 
(ICSID); 
b. Arbitration under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 18 
March 1965 (ICSID) in accordance with the Rules on the Additional Facility for 
the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the Centre, where the 
personal or factual preconditions for proceedings pursuant to (a) do not 
apply, but at least one Contracting Party is a member of the Convention 
referred to therein, or104; 
c. An individual arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal which is established in 
accordance with the rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) as in force at the commencement of the proceedings, 
or; 
d. An arbitral tribunal which is established pursuant to the Dispute Resolution 
Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), or; 
e. Any other form of dispute settlement agreed by the parties to the dispute. 
                                                
103 Supra note 90. A comparison with the German model BIT may prove to be useful to 
emphasize the differences between a BIT executed by a Member State and a BIT executed by 
the EU as an organization. 
104 It should be clarified once again that the inclusion of this sub-article is conditional – it may 
only be included provided that an amendment in order to include non-state international 
actors within the scope of the Additional Facility has been introduced and accepted. 
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3. The award shall be binding and shall not be subject to any appeal or remedy 
other than those provided for in the Convention or arbitral rules on which the 
arbitral proceedings chosen by the investor are based. The award shall be 
enforced by the Contracting Parties as a final and absolute ruling under their 
domestic law105. 
4. Arbitration proceedings pursuant to this Article shall take place at the request of 
one of the parties to the dispute in a state which is a Contracting Party to the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958. 
5. During arbitration proceedings or the enforcement of an award, the Contracting 
Party involved in the dispute shall not raise the objection that the investor of the 
other Contracting Party has received compensation under an insurance contract 
in respect of all or part of the damage. 
Following the traditional European tendency, we have mainly based our model on the 
current German Model; however we have provided for different alternatives from the 
French and the UK Models. Such a model, although not definite, presents more or 
less what a legally (and politically) possible EU BIT dispute settlement clause could 
resemble. In any case, it is certain that an interesting, yet challenging path is ahead 
for the EU – and we shall observe developments with immense enthusiasm and 
curiosity. 
                                                
105 Given that the enforcement shall take place at the EU level, the term used for such a clause 
shall nonetheless include the EU acquis communitaire in its entirety. 
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